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I Introduction
It is widely held that truth and reference play an indispensable
explanatory role in theories of meaning. By contrast, so-called de-
flationists argue that the functions of these concepts are merely ex-
pressive and never explanatory. Robert Brandom has proposed both
a variety of deflationism—the anaphoric theory—, and a theory of
meaning—inferentialism—which doesn’t rely on truth or reference.
He argues that the anaphoric theory counts against his (chiefly re-
ferentialist) rivals in the debate on meaning and thereby paves the
way for inferentialism.
In this paper, I give a friendly reconstruction of anaphoric de-
flationism (section II) and point to a distinguishing feature of the
theory with respect to other deflationist proposals. While Brandom
simply assumes, but doesn’t earn this feature, I propose a natural
argument to justify it (section III). Then, however, I point out a
subtle but clear sense in which truth and reference can play a role
in explaining meaning, even if the anaphoric theory holds. Thus,
anaphoric deflationism will turn out to be neutral in the debate on
meaning (section IV).
52
D. Lo¨wenstein
II Anaphoric deflationism
While there is some disagreement over how best to define de-
flationism, I take it that the most fruitful proposal relies on distin-
guishing two kinds of questions (compare Armour-Garb and Beall
2005).
The substantial questions What is truth? What is reference?
The functional questions What is the conceptual role of truth
and the linguistic role of ‘true’ and related expressions? What
is the conceptual role of reference and the linguistic role of
‘refers to’ and related expressions?
Traditionally, philosophers take both kinds of questions seriously.
They give an account of what truth and reference are, and then
employ this account to explain their role in thought and talk. I will
call these proposals ‘substantial theories of truth and reference’ or
‘substantivism’. By contrast, deflationists think that asking what
truth and reference are is at least uninteresting and maybe even
deeply misguided. Rather, answering the functional questions is the
only interesting thing to do. In shrugging their shoulders at the
substantial questions, deflationists are local metaphysical quietists:
As for the alleged nature of truth and reference, they don’t undertake
any ontological commitment whatsoever.
Deflationary theories differ in how to make sense of the functional
roles of truth and reference. As its name already reveals, the ana-
phoric theory relies on anaphoric mechanisms. 1 That is, it relies on
relations between linguistic expressions that allow some expression
tokenings, anaphoric dependents, to anaphorically inherit the mean-
ings of other expression tokenings, anaphoric antecedents. Pronouns
are paradigmatic examples for anaphoric expressions. Consider the
following example.
(1) Even though a friend of mine strongly believes in him, she
could never convince me to believe in God myself.
1For the original presentation and development of the theory, compare Grover
et al. 1975, Brandom 1984, 1988, 1994 and 2002.
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Here, the tokening of ‘she’ is anaphorically dependent on its an-
tecedent ‘a friend of mine’. It inherits its meaning by referring back
to that antecedent. Also, the tokening of ‘him’ is dependent on its
antecedent ‘God’. In this case, the anaphoric dependent refers forth
to that antecedent and thereby inherits its meaning.2
II.1 Truth
The main idea of the anaphoric account of truth is to treat com-
plex expressions formed with expressions like ‘is true’ as prosentences.
When concerned merely with truth and not with reference, anaphoric
deflationism is therefore also often referred to as ‘prosententialism’.
Prosentences are anaphorically dependent sentences that inherit
their meanings from other sentence tokenings. Truth talk, the claim
goes, does not involve attributions of a property to, say, sentences
or propositions. Rather, truth talk relies on a unique anaphoric
prosentence-forming operator.
Consider the following example of ordinary truth talk.
(2) Sarah’s self-description is true.
(2) is understood as a prosentence which inherits its meaning from
a claim by Sarah, a sentence tokening picked out by the expression
‘Sarah’s self-description’. For example, in a context where Sarah has
said ‘I am a maverick’, (2) means
(3) Sarah is a maverick.
Other instances of truth talk add a quantificational dimension to the
story. For example, (4) is understood as (5) and (6) as (7).
(4) Some of these provocative remarks are actually true.
(5) There are some sentence tokenings ‘t’ such that (i) ‘t’ is among
these provocative remarks, and (ii) actually, t.
(6) Everything John just said is true.
2Linguists call the latter phenomenon ‘cataphora’ and reserve the term ‘anaph-
ora’ for ‘forwards’ cases like the former. Cataphora and anaphora are, in turn,
subclasses of endophora. Thus, strictly speaking, the theory is endophoric rather
than anaphoric.
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(7) For all sentence tokenings ‘t’, if John just said ‘t’, then t.
Given the occurrence of the variables both inside and outside of quo-
tation marks, the quantifiers have to be understood substitutionally.
Prosentences are generic. That is, any sentence tokening can be
the antecedent of a prosentence, given that it is specified uniquely,
e.g., by description or quotation. Prosentences inherit their mean-
ings from the set of their anaphoric antecedents—a singleton in ‘lazy’
cases like (2) as opposed to quantificational cases like (4) and (6).
Prosentences can occur free-standing or embedded in logically com-
plex sentences, e.g., as antecedents of conditionals.3
But what are prosentences good for? The answer is that they
enable speakers to say things they couldn’t say otherwise. For exam-
ple, one can blindly endorse or reject claims, as in (8), one can reject
one from a set of claims without specifying which, like in (9), and
one can endorse large or even infinite sets of claims in one breath, as
in (10).
(8) What the editorial of tomorrow’s Times will say is true.
(9) At least one of Brandom’s claims is false.
(10) All theorems of first-order logic are true.
Finally, the anaphoric theory also implies an important scheme:
Truth scheme ‘φ’ is true just in case φ.
The left hand side of this biconditional is interpreted as a prosentence,
and if the sentence quoted on the left is the one used on the right,
they will share their meaning by anaphoric inheritance and thereby
validate the biconditional.
II.2 Reference
The main idea of the anaphoric account of reference is to treat
complex expressions formed with expressions like ‘refers to’ as in-
direct definite descriptions. These are anaphorically dependent sin-
gular terms which inherit their meanings from other singular term
3This implies that the Liar is a prima facie admissible prosentence. Grover
(1977) has attempted a prosententialist dissolution of the Liar, but I cannot
discuss these issues here.
55
Anaphoric Deflationism and Theories of Meaning
tokenings. Reference talk, the claim goes, does not involve attribu-
tions of a relation between linguistic expressions and objects. Rather,
reference talk relies on a unique anaphoric pronoun-forming opera-
tor.
Take this example to help clarify the idea:
(11) What you referred to as ‘that cat’ was actually a fox.
Here, the indirect definite description ‘what you referred to as
‘that cat” inherits its meaning from the addressee’s latest tokening
of ‘that cat’. Assuming a suitable context, it is therefore a way of
saying
(12) What we saw in the garden was actually a fox.
Like prosentences, indirect definite descriptions can be used quantifi-
cationally:
(13) All of these names refer to friends of mine.
(14) I referred to Plato earlier.
Like quantified truth talk, (13) and (14) are elaborated as the fol-
lowing substitutionally quantified statements:
(15) For all singular term tokenings ‘t’, if ‘t’ is among these names,
then the one referred to by ‘t’ is a friend of mine.
(16) There are some singular term tokenings ‘t’ with the property
that (i) I uttered ‘t’ earlier and (ii) the one referred to by ‘t’
is Plato.
What are indirect definite descriptions good for? Just like prosen-
tences, they enrich the expressive resources of a language. Chiefly,
they allow for speakers to continue any anaphoric chain of singu-
lar term tokenings, as long as the antecedent tokening is specified
uniquely. This includes both tokenings of a type-substitution invari-
ant expressions, such as proper names, and expressions not cotyp-
ically substitutable, such as pronouns. Furthermore, in the quan-
tificational cases, one may use, say, (13) in order to avoid giving
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all the names in question. And one may employ (14) regardless of
whether one has used the expression ‘Plato’ or ‘Aristotle’s teacher’
or anything like that.
Finally, the anaphoric theory also implies an important scheme:
Reference scheme ‘φ’ refers to ψ just in case φ is ψ.
Changing merely what is focused on rather than its meaning, the left
hand side of this scheme is reformulated as an identity statement:
Reference scheme* The one referred to by ‘φ’ is ψ just in case φ
is ψ.
Now, the expression ‘the one referred to by ‘φ” is interpreted as
an indirect definite description which inherits its content from some
previous tokening of ‘φ’. The scheme is thereby validated whenever
the ‘φ’ quoted on its left hand side is the one used on its right.
Obviously, this includes all type-substitution invariant expressions
‘φ’, e.g., proper names.
III Anaphoric operators
On the anaphoric theory, prosentences are defined as the unique
expression type formed by the truth operator, and indirect definite
descriptions as the one formed by the reference operator. How should
these anaphoric operators be understood?
III.1 The need for demarcation
Let me elaborate why this question is crucial for proponents of
the anaphoric theory.
A standard way to support the idea, against deflationists, that
substantive accounts of truth and reference are called for, is to say
that since ‘is true’ and ‘refers to’ are predicates, there have to be
underlying properties which substantive accounts of truth and refer-
ence need to analyze. Other varieties of deflationism react to this
argument by saying that the properties in question are merely defla-
tionary or purely logical. Or they deny that there are properties at
all underlying the predicates in question. By contrast, the anaphoric
theory is more radical. It denies that truth and reference talk are
57
Anaphoric Deflationism and Theories of Meaning
predicative at all and holds that it involves unique anaphoric oper-
ators instead. This strategy blocks the move from language use to
properties from the outset.
Moreover, it also comes in handy elsewhere: Michael Devitt
(2002) has argued that deflationism has hidden metaphysical com-
mittments. He holds that metaphysics is “explanatory prior” to
language (Devitt, 2002, pp. 61, 63), and argues that
an anti-realist metaphysics is needed to motivate the revisionist
view of language [...]. If there were not something problematic
about the area of reality that ‘true’ [..] appear[s] to concern why
suppose that [it] does not have the standard semantics of a descrip-
tive predicate? (Devitt, 2002, p. 65)
But this complaint is based on the premise that ‘is true’ is a
predicate. Thus, if the anaphoric theory can account for truth talk
in terms of an anaphoric operator rather than a predicate, Devitt’s
criticism misfires. Analogous arguments apply to ‘refers to’.
III.2 Defining the operators
I have argued that the anaphoric theory relies heavily on the
distinction between the analysis of truth and reference talk as pred-
icative and their analysis as anaphoric. But what accounts for this
distinction? Brandom explicitly defines the reference operator and
thus distinguishes reference talk from predication. Surprisingly, how-
ever, he remains silent about the truth operator. In what follows, I
will argue that a suitable definition of the latter can be modeled on
the former.4
Brandom claims that an expression qualifies as an instance of the
reference operator � just in case it satisfies the following criterion
solely in virtue of its meaning.
Iteration condition (reference) Let [φ] be the type of φ and
([φ]) a token of the type [φ]. Then �([φ]) = �([�([φ])]).
4In a response to a paper by Mark Lance, Brandom can be read as already
hinting at this idea. But even if so, what he explicitly says about this is far from
clear (compare Brandom 1997).
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Using ‘refers’ as the paradigm of the reference operator � and
stipulating that this alone suffices to pick out some previous utter-
ance uniquely, the criterion states:
(17) the one referred to as ‘φ’ = the one referred to as ‘the one
referred to as ‘φ”
According to this definition, expressions like ‘the one denoted by ‘φ”
also qualify as instances of the reference operator. But expressions
like ‘the one praised as ‘φ” or ‘the one insulted by saying ‘φ” are
excluded. For example, one may pick up the meaning of a tokening
of the expression ‘this important philosopher’ by saying ‘the one
praised as ‘this important philosopher”. But saying ‘the one praised
as ‘the one praised as ‘this important philosopher”’ might well fail
to continue this anaphoric chain. Reporting and expressing praise
don’t coincide.
My proposal for an amendment of prosententialism, the ana-
phoric account of truth, is strictly analogous. I propose to treat
an expression as an instance of the truth operator ϑ just in case it
satisfies the following criterion solely in virtue of its meaning.
Iteration condition (truth) Let [φ] be the type of φ and ([φ])
a token of the type [φ]. Then ϑ([φ]) if and only if ϑ([ϑ([φ])]).
Using ‘true’ as the paradigm of the truth operator ϑ, and stip-
ulating that this alone suffices to pick out some previous utterance
uniquely, this second criterion states:
(18) ‘φ’ is true if and only if “φ’ is true’ is true.
On this definition, expressions such as ‘It is the case that φ’ or,
arguably, “φ’ is a fact’ will turn out to be instances of the truth
operator. Other expressions, by contrast, are excluded, e.g., ‘It is a
pity that φ’. For it might well be a pity that my favorite team lost
since victory would have been a great reward for a season of hard
work. But that doesn’t mean that it is a pity that it is a pity that
they lost, since their defeat’s being a pity doesn’t itself have any bad
consequences.
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III.3 The opposition to predicates
How do these criteria underwrite the claim that truth and refer-
ence talk are not predicative?
For a start, the iteration conditions would have to be reinter-
preted to fit predicative cases. A truth predicate T , for example,
would be defined as holding of any x just in case it also holds of
T (x). And a relational reference predicate R would be defined as
holding between any x and y just in case it also holds between x
and the unique z which stands in R to y. However, even if this can
be somehow made to work, the anaphoric theory rules out such an
interpretation. Let me show this for the truth operator and keep an
analogous argument about the reference operator implicit.
Take three sentences like the following.
(19) Dogs bark.
(20) ‘Dogs bark’ is true.
(21) “Dogs bark’ is true’ is true.
On the anaphoric theory, (20) inherits its meaning from (19) and
(21) from (20). Thus, they all have the very same meaning. By
contrast, if truth talk is understood as predicative, (19) is about
dogs, (20) about a sentence about dogs and (21) about a sentence
about a sentence about dogs. Thus, there is a difference in meaning
after all, a difference one may describe in terms of three levels of
semantic ascent, from non-semantic in (19) to semantic in (20) to
meta-semantic in (21). On the anaphoric theory, this ascent is an
illusion. The semantic ‘ladder’ is horizontal. Thus, the iteration
condition implies that truth talk cannot be predicative.
This last point brings out that the above iteration conditions, to-
gether with the rest of the anaphoric theory, don’t merely have to be
fulfilled solely in virtue of the meanings of the candidate expressions.
After all, the expression ‘is a quotable expression’ arguably also ful-
fills both of them in virtue of its meaning.5 Rather, the resultant
expressions, too, have to share their meanings, as their respective
roles in the anaphoric chain ensures.
5I am indebted to Miguel Hoeltje for confronting me with this example.
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This feature is often criticized: Couldn’t somebody accept that
‘Dogs bark’ is true without knowing the meaning of ‘Dogs bark’?
How, then, are these supposed to share their meanings? But it is en-
tirely possible to accept a prosentence without being able to identify
its antecedent. This is even one of the expressive advantages of the
truth operator: blind endorsements like (8) on page 55.
IV Substantivism and theories of meaning
I have argued that proponents of the anaphoric theory can coher-
ently shrug their shoulders at the substantive questions what truth
and reference consist in. However, what does this mean for the an-
swers actually proposed by substantivists and for explanations of
meaning in terms of truth and reference?
IV.1 Substantivism
I take it that substantial accounts in general can be characterized
by the claim that there is some substantial property— T , say— had
by everything and only what is true, and that whatever is referred
to by some expression stands is some substantial relation to it— say,
R. Thus, the position can be expressed as follows:
Substantivism ‘φ’ is true just in case ‘φ’ has the substantial prop-
erty T .
‘φ’ refers to ψ just in case ‘φ’ stands in the substantial relation R
to ψ.
The first and crucial thing to note about Substantivism is its logical
independence from the anaphoric theory. Recall that the anaphoric
theory validates the following schemes:
Semantic schemes ‘φ’ is true just in case φ.
‘φ’ refers to ψ just in case φ is ψ.
On the anaphoric theory, these schemes are true in virtue of the
meanings of the expressions formed with ‘true’ and ‘refers’. For
example, ‘φ’ is true just in case φ because “φ’ is true’ means that
φ. Thus, the anaphoric theory implies that Substantivism means
Substantivism*:
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Substantivism* φ just in case ‘φ’ has the substantial property T .
φ is ψ just in case ‘φ’ stands in the substantial relation R to ψ.
However, Substantivism* is a claim without any use of truth and ref-
erence talk. Thus, it should be clear that it is logically independent
from the anaphoric theory.
Mark Lance (1997) has already discovered half of this result, the
part concerning truth talk only. He concluded that
the anaphoric theory is not incompatible with any currently pop-
ular account of truth, charitably understood . . . [N]o one has yet
succeeded even in offering a theory incompatible with the anaphoric
account, much less a refutation (Lance, 1997, pp. 283, 297).
However, Lance is too quick with the expression ‘charitably un-
derstood’. If substantive accounts should be understood as maxi-
mally plausible from the point of view of anaphoric deflationism, he
is certainly right. But we should also seek a charitable reading of
the substantivists’ ideas which takes their self-description as actually
contradicting deflationism seriously.
What Lance fails to see is that Substantivism turned out to be
compatible with anaphoric deflationism because it was stated as a
purely extensional claim about expressions like “φ’ is true’ and “φ’
refers to ψ’ rather than about their meanings, or intensions. Full-
blown substantivists hold that truth and T on the one hand and
reference and R on the other don’t merely coincide, but that truth
is T and reference is R. In contrast with the above characterization
of Substantivism, this idea can be expressed as follows:
Full-blown Substantivism “φ’ is true’ means that ‘φ’ has the
substantial property T .
“φ’ refers to ψ’ means that ‘φ’ stands in the substantial relation R
to ψ.
This, however, collides with anaphoric deflationism. The iteration
conditions employed to define the truth and reference operators clearly
show that “φ’ has the substantial property T ’ is not an instance of
the truth operator, and that ‘the one standing in the substantial rela-
tion R to ψ’ is not an instance of the reference operator. Even if they
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were to fulfill thir respective iteration conditions, the resultant ex-
pressions would fail to share their meaning.6 Thus, these expressions
are predicates, the anaphoric operators are not.
Thus, there is a clear disagreement between anaphoric deflation-
ism and substantivism, after all: However the property T and the re-
lation R are understood exactly, substantivists claim and anaphoric
deflationists deny that ‘true’, ‘refers’ and cognates mean T and R,
respectively.
However, this is indeed all there is to the disagreement. In order
to reject Full-blown Substantivism, the anaphoric deflationist needs
additional arguments against T and R. And in order to reject ana-
phoric deflationism after Full-blown Substantivism has already fallen,
the substantivist needs additional arguments against its functional
anaphoric analysis of truth and reference talk. This is where their
debate should continue.
IV.2 Meaning
Let me now discuss the implications of these insights for theories
of meaning. Brandom thinks that the anaphoric theory makes it
impossible to explain meaning in terms of truth or reference. He
tries to establish this claim with what I call his Argument from
Anaphora:7
1. If the anaphoric theory is true, then truth and reference are ex-
plained in terms of anaphora.
2. Anaphora can only be explained in terms of meaning, namely in
terms of inheritance of meaning.
3. For all concepts, if α is explained in terms of β, and β can only
be explained in terms of γ,then γ cannot be explained in terms
of α.
6Colin McGinn (2002) takes up this dialectical position about truth when
he claims that the disquotational nature of truth fails to support deflationism,
but reveals its nature as “a device of ontological leapfrog”. He even defines the
substantial property of truth by something like the iteration condition.
7Compare Brandom 1994 and 2002. The literature on deflationism and mean-
ing is full of cognate arguments. Their shared structure can be made explicit by
substituting, say, ‘disquotation’ for ‘anaphora’ in the argument presented here.
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4. Therefore, if the anaphoric theory is true, then meaning cannot
be explained in terms of truth or reference.
However, this argument is far from a refutation of the idea that
substantive accounts of truth and reference can be employed to ex-
plain meaning. True, the anaphoric theory precludes truth and ref-
erence from playing any explanatory role, but it is entirely neutral
on what substantivists claim truth and reference consist in. If the
anaphoric theory is correct, the substantivist has to sacrifice Full-
blown Substantivism, but nothing more. When claiming that truth
and reference explain meaning, one can simply give away the words
‘truth’ and ‘reference’, but maintain that the substantial properties
T and R explain meaning.
Let me spell this out for the referentialist family of substantivist
proposals, which Brandom is at most pains to reject. Referentialism,
I take it, is the conjunction of a correspondence theory of truth and
a causal-historical theory of reference. Thus, referentialists replace
‘T ’ in the above schemes with, say, ‘corresponds to a truth-maker’
and ‘R’ with ‘is causal-historically connected to’.
Crucially, whenever a referentialist appeals to what she calls
‘truth’ and ‘reference’, there will be a clear sense in which she actually
appeals to correspondence and causal-historical connectedness.
Traditionally, the situation is this: Truth and reference are sup-
posed to explain meaning, truth is correspondence, and reference is
causal-historical connectedness. But explanatory relations are tran-
sitive. Thus, at the ground level, it is correspondence and causal-
historical connectedness which explain meaning.
By contrast, if the referentialist buys into the anaphoric theory,
drops Full-blown Substantivism and contents herself with Substan-
tivism*, this argument becomes superfluous. Rather, the claim that
truth and reference explain meaning becomes a potentially mislead-
ing shorthand for saying that, from the outset, the actual explanans
is correspondence and causal-historical connectedness.
Thus, Brandom cannot invoke the anaphoric theory in order to ar-
gue against referentialist or other substantivist explanations of mean-
ing. And likewise, one cannot invoke such an explanation of meaning
in order to reject the anaphoric theory (like Schantz 2002 and many
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others). The anaphoric theory is logically independent from theories
of meaning such as referentialism and inferentialism.
V Conclusion
I have argued, first, that the anaphoric theory can account for
its most radically deflationary claim that ‘truth’ and ‘reference’ are
operators as opposed to predicates. Second, I have shown how sub-
stantivists can accept the anaphoric theory if they are willing to give
away the words ‘truth’ and ‘reference’ and content themselves with
the claim that truth and reference coincide with certain substantial
properties. Thus, the explanatory value of those substantial proper-
ties is untouched by anaphoric deflationism and the debate over the
explanation of meaning remains undecided.
However, these results shouldn’t be taken to suggest that the
debate between deflationism and substantivism is over. Instead, we
should continute to discuss the functional analyses of truth and ref-
erence talk proposed by deflationists. As for anaphoric deflationism,
we are now in a position to assess its distinctive and controversial
characteristic, the claim that ‘truth’ and ‘reference’ are operators as
opposed to predicates. Further, we should discuss the plausibility
and explanatory power of Full-blown Substantivism in comparison
with its more modest cousin Substantivism*. But, one way or the
other, theories of meaning are independent from the outcome of this
debate.8
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